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Section I: Introduction 
Comprehensive immigration policy has been and continues to be a challenge for 
American policy makers. Although this can be said for many other problems, a holistic approach 
to immigration policy must address several social, economic, and political ramifications. In other 
words, it is a dynamic issue that requires more than one sweeping solution to become 
“comprehensive”. For instance, in times of economic downturn, policy makers may reassess the 
economic impacts of increased foreign labor flows as Americans argue they are increasing 
competition for scarce jobs. Immigration can also become an issue of national security, namely 
after the 9/11 attacks which heightened perceived fears of immigrants and prompted tighter 
border protection. In addition, public opinion on immigration is also complex in nature as the 
issue can be framed in several different ways. Citizens may be asked of their beliefs on 
immigration’s impact on jobs and wages, national security, or perhaps their influence on 
American culture. My objective is to examine a number of variables that likely influence the 
public’s anti-immigrant attitudes. By analyzing the results of a 2018 polling data set from Pew 
Research Center, the variables I examine include nativism, partisanship, socioeconomic status 
(education and income), locale, age, and sex.  
The motive behind this research stems from the increasing relevance of comprehensive 
immigration policy that desperately requires a better understanding of these underlying 
components.  The uncertainty of what U.S. citizens perceive the issue to stem from makes it 
difficult for legislators to pinpoint a solution. For some, immigrants are a perceived economic 
threat; others may see it as an invasion of culture and social norms; and of course, partisanship 
may clearly define those limits for people as well. The reason public opinion measurements of 
immigration are important to this issue is because it provides a guide for lawmakers on how to 
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approach the issue. Granted, public opinion is almost never unanimous on anything. However, 
when dealing with a conflict that captures such a wide array of variables, knowing which ones 
are the most influential provides a starting point.  
Section II: Public Opinion Polls and Immigration 
 The bulk of professional and academic research in public opinion lies within 
organizations like Gallup and Pew that conduct frequent surveys to measure changing opinions. 
These measures are the typical reports seen in the media that show how changes in a new 
immigration policy, for example, increases immigration’s saliency.  
 Research into this topic typically begins with opinion polls probing a citizen’s beliefs on 
optimal immigration levels. Results are then used to assess overall sentiment towards 
immigration into the U.S. For example, Gallup has been conducting a poll at least once a year 
since 1965 asking, “Should immigration be kept at its present level, increased, or decreased?” 
(Jones, 2019). Studying polls that ask the same question over extended periods of time provides 
some insight into where overall sentiments are heading. Recently, its June 2019 survey indicated 
a plurality of Americans (37%) support maintaining current levels. Not far behind at 35% are 
those that would like to see a decrease and trailing are the 27% that favor an increase. This poll 
provides a convenient snapshot of what direction Americans believe immigration reform should 
take.  
However, breaking immigration down can be much more complicated when accounting 
for the sources of those opinions. As aforementioned, people form their opinions for different 
reasons like party loyalty or perhaps perceptions of threat. People who self-identify with the 
Republican Party, for example, may be more likely to oppose open border policies as to align 
with the current party platform. This can be expressed in a measurement of public opinion or 
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perhaps a vote for a Republican candidate that aligns with that same policy platform. As 
mentioned, perception of threat is another potential motivator for changing immigration 
attitudes. The classic example of the heightened border security after 9/11 shows how even 
perceived fears of threats from immigrants can have a similar effect on policy views. Pew 
conducted a poll in January 2002, which found that 90% of Republicans and 82% of Democrats 
thought President Bush should focus efforts to amplify border security (Gramlich, 2018). Right 
after 9/11, partisanship nearly disappeared as the country rallied around a common cause. This 
example demonstrates how the public can easily change its opinions on immigration given an 
exogenous shock such as 9/11.  
Further, the way in which questions are worded or framed in opinion polls can also shift 
the focus and make immigration attitudes more complex. For example, one poll from Gallup 
notes that “immigration” in its question means both legal and illegal immigration (Gallup, 2019). 
When undocumented immigrants are specifically mentioned, we see some different results. 
Respondents were first asked to rank the situation “Large numbers of immigrants entering the 
United States” in terms of urgency. 39% of respondents said it was a critical threat (Gallup, 
2019). However, when “undocumented” is added to the phrase, those that believe it is a critical 
threat jumped to 47% (Gallup, 2019). A simple explanation for this difference may be that 
“undocumented” creates a negative image. Opponents of increased immigration frequently 
associate illegal immigrants with bringing over crime, abuse of government assistance, and/or 
other negative connotations (Reeves & Johnson, 2008). In other words, people that oppose 
immigration may do so for different reasons. When looking at the dynamic relationship between 
public opinion and policymaking, immigration’s multiple reference points make it difficult to 
pinpoint what drives these beliefs the most.  
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Examining the literature in this field from a blend of political scientists, psychologists, 
and sociologists, we see attempts to measure the strength of the variables in question.1 Before 
analyzing the current literature, it is important to understand the historical evolution of the public 
opinion/immigration relationship. By observing changes in anti-immigration sentiment and 
where they stemmed from, we will have an underlying knowledge to better understand changes 
in those variables across a timeless debate.  
Evolution of American Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 
While anti-immigrant sentiment and laws associated with it goes back to the country’s 
founding, current trends have evolved from relatively recent events. As mass immigration 
increased at the close of the 19th century, so did anxiety among Americans. In 1882, Congress 
passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, which was the first legislation in the country’s history that 
placed significant limits on immigration. Just a few years later in 1885, a group of white miners 
in Wyoming blamed their Chinese counterparts for their economic troubles. In an act of 
aggression, they killed 28 Chinese miners which become known as the Rock Springs massacre 
(A&E Television Networks, 2017). Later in 1913, California passed another bill (out of many) 
that denied “aliens ineligible for citizenship” the right to own land. Known as the Webb-Haney 
Act, this bill passed during the height of Asian immigration into the U.S. As Asian immigration 
increased on the West Coast, so too did efforts to curb it (Smithsonian, n.d.).  
The late 1960s and early 1970s also proved to be pivotal when observing increased 
immigration restrictions. As a reversal of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act which placed the “national 
 
1 It is worth mentioning that public opinion towards immigrants is not always based on accurate information. For 
instance, negative public opinion of immigrants contrasts empirical evidence that illegal immigrants do not 
excessively use social services, nor do they display unusually high rates of criminality (Nowrasteh & Orr, 2018; 
Ingraham, 2018). The examination of empirical data on immigrant behavior and public opinion raises the potential 
for another study that is outside the scope of this research. 
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origins” quota on incoming immigrants from Europe, the 1965 Immigration Act removed many 
of those barriers to entry for immigrants. With the expectation of moving on from an 
immigration policy based on American eugenics, the 1965 act ended up inflaming fears of 
overpopulation and boosting nativist sentiment (Normandin & Valles, 2015). In 1968, Paul 
Ehrlich’s explosive book titled Population Bomb was a response to a new America with 
unrestricted immigration. It stoked fears of overpopulation and the impending doom that faced 
the planet if it were to continue (Normandin & Valles, 2015). John Tanton, an anti-immigrant 
activist under the guise of environmental protection, started the Zero Population Group based on 
Ehrlich’s predictions. As a resounding activist for his group, he laid the foundation for what 
would become a network of anti-immigrant/nativist groups like US English, which is still active 
today in pushing for the declaration of English as the national language (Normandin & Valles, 
2015).  
In more recent years, U.S. immigration policy has taken on a larger role in foreign policy. 
Beginning in the Bush 41 administration, thousands of Haitian refugees escaping political 
violence sought asylum in the U.S. Despite current policies (domestically and internationally) 
allowing refugees to seek asylum, the U.S. Coast Guard ultimately put them into prison camps 
(Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2018). The detention length of Haitian refugees was 
indefinite, and the camps failed to provide decent living conditions. During the presidential 
election, the Clinton campaign advocated the release of the refugees, but maintained the 
operation after the election. This strategy could have been influenced by a strong disapproval of 
allowing these refugees into the country. A 1994 poll from CBS/New York Times showed a 77% 
disapproval and 19% approval of the Haitian refugees coming into the country (DeSilver, 2015).  
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The events of 9/11 provide the most recent example of how significant foreign threats 
influence immigrant-restricting laws and sentiment. While immigration restrictions primarily 
targeted those coming from countries with ties to Al-Qaeda, it strengthened national security’s 
role in immigration policy (Chishti & Bergeron, 2017). After the attacks, terrorism prevention 
became a priority. Since the attackers entered the country through legal means, cracking down on 
those ports of entry became essential to national security. In the years following 2001, several 
policies regarding detention practices and court proceedings of Middle Eastern immigrants were 
deemed by civil libertarians to be excessively harsh (Chishti & Bergeron, 2017). Indefinite 
detentions, use of secret evidence in trials, and explicit targeting of Muslims were enforced. 
Although many of these policies are no longer in effect today, they still influenced the 
importance of security in immigration policy. Challenges to these policies could not overcome 
the increased deference to the executive branch (Chishti & Bergeron, 2017). Immigration policy 
since has become an exercise of executive power that is consequential to politics and public 
opinion. 
Section III: Accounting for Public Sentiment and Immigration 
Scholars have forwarded several political and social factors to explain anti-immigrant 
sentiment. Lee & Kim (2018) and Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) both assert that issue 
salience and efforts to measure public opinion go hand in hand. For example, the push for and 
debate surrounding the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of 2007 caused a spike of 15% 
interest among respondents. Support then sunk dramatically to 2% over the following two years, 
then jumped back to 10% after Arizona’s S.B. 1070, which enacted several strict anti-
immigration laws to curb illegal immigration. In 2014, another spike occurred after President 
Obama announced his Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program (DACA). The most 
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recent Gallup measures now show immigration at an all-time high in importance among 
Americans. As of July 2019, immigration is now a top issue for 27% of Americans, likely due to 
the substantial media attention over Central American refugees (Gallup, 2019). These surges 
may suggest that the sources of immigration attitudes are amplified by exogenous shocks created 
by legislation or events that bring immigration to the forefront. It is worth noting that these 
components likely have an impact on public opinion. However, for the purpose of this project, I 
will discuss the variables on an individual level that are expected to play a role in determining 
those changes in attitudes. Further research can perhaps examine the similarities and/or 
differences between individual characteristics and the impact elite agenda setting has on public 
opinion in the immigration debate. 
Nativism 
One variable given consideration in the literature is nativism or, in psychological terms, 
implicit association. To measure this, surveyors use specific language in a series of questions to 
learn about the root causes that lead respondents to certain answers. While Lee & Kim (2018) 
touch on the procedures involved with implicit association tests (IATs) and nativist 
measurements, Knoll (2013) goes further into the mechanisms of implicit association when 
measuring public opinion. Given that immigration can be a personal subject and in recent years 
has become even more racially charged, surveyors have sought to understand how potent 
nativism and the protection of traditional culture is to American immigration attitudes. In any 
IAT, respondents initially give what is known as an explicit answer- that is, a response that is 
thought-out and consciously processed. Implicit, on the other hand, is a person’s underlying 
opinions or world outlook that could be a culmination of past experiences. Implicit behavior can 
manifest without the person knowing and is out of his/her control (Knoll, 2013). 
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In 2009, Knoll conducted a study using an IAT that comprised of 625 white non-Hispanic 
college students at a Midwestern university. Respondents were presented with images of 
“traditional American culture” like American flags, baseball, and Uncle Sam. The second set of 
objects represented a more integrated environment with images of bilingual “vote here” signs, 
the U.S. and Mexico flags together, and a walking taco saluting an American flag (Knoll 2013). 
An individual’s difference in response times to analyzing the images as good or bad leads to 
possible implicit bias. Implicit behavior is evident when respondents begin associating images of 
foreign culture with “bad” and vice versa. Results from the survey show that 80% of respondents 
exhibited some degree of biased behavior with more than 40% in the “high” range. With scores 
ranging from -0.94 to 1.51, the mean was 0.53; a moderate-to-strong level of implicit behavior 
(Knoll 2013).  
Pérez (2010) conducted a similar study that had respondents sort stimuli first into 
mismatched pairs where “white immigrant” is “bad” and “Latino immigrant” is “good”. In the 
second trial, the pairs were theoretically matched where “white immigrant” is “good” and 
“Latino immigrant” is “bad”. The difference between these response times demonstrates the 
implicit association effect. Pérez suggests that using the IAT to measure opposition to 
immigration can tell us three things: a person’s level of tolerance towards Latino immigrants; the 
likelihood of supporting alternative measures like authoritarianism or ethnocentrism; and the 
extent to which explicit behaviors mediate implicit ones (Pérez, 2010).  The results show that 
participants had faster response times in the matched trial (where Latino immigrants were paired 
with “bad”) than the mismatched trial. Pérez asserts that the difference in response times 
between the two trials is statistically significant and reveals a positive IAT score as an indicator 
of implicit bias against Latino immigrants.  
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To further confirm his hypothesis, the second matchup was with Latino and Asian 
immigrants (the latter as opposed to White). Although the difference in response times was 
slightly less, the change in comparison between Latino and other ethnic immigrants had little 
effect on IAT scores. Also, to rule out the assumption that these results are based on cultural bias 
rather than individual bias, Pérez compares the IAT scores of self-identified Hispanic and Asian 
participants with White participants. The former both had negative IAT scores, showing an 
implicit bias not against but for their respective ethnic immigrants. In other words, their negative 
scores strengthen the validity of the IAT to measure individual rather than cultural bias. Hence, 
Pérez found sufficient evidence to claim the IAT is a reliable predictor of individual implicit bias 
(Pérez, 2010). 
In relation to opinions on immigration policy, research conducted using the IAT in this 
field has shown the tool’s effectiveness in measuring implicit assumptions and how they relate to 
explicit opinions or answers. Pérez followed up with data on varying factors and their respective 
magnitudes that contribute to negative assumptions of Latino immigrants. Whether legal or 
illegal was specified in the study, ethnocentrism had a strong influence on a participant’s 
preference for exclusionary immigration policy (Pérez, 2010). Following Knoll and Pérez’ work 
on nativism, I intend to examine its influence on public opinion, especially as it relates to 
negative immigrant sentiments. Given the nature of the immigration issue, being able to measure 
nativism is critical when collecting public opinion data. Capturing implicit association among 
respondents has potential in showing true attitudes that respondents may not be willing to report. 
Thus, including this type of data in a measurement of social attitudes and behaviors strengthens a 
study’s predictive power. However, it should be noted that IAT measurements are not perfect in 
reading implicit bias and are difficult to incorporate into public opinion polls. Accounting for 
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this challenge, my Research Design section will explain my proposal to measure nativism using 
a question from the 2018 Pew poll that best taps into those sentiments.   
Political Party Affiliation 
Conventional wisdom suggests that there is a clear divide between Democrats and 
Republicans when immigration policy is in question. This seemingly innate knowledge can be 
broken down by how each party views the problem. The Republican platform typically views 
immigration as a security issue. The policies backed by Republicans deal with curbing illegal 
immigration; enacting stricter penalties on those that overstay their visas; limiting or prohibiting 
the use of sanctuary cities; and/or limiting the excessive distribution of public funds for 
immigrants (Reeves & Johnson, 2008). Democrats tend to see immigration from a more social 
perspective. Although security is also important, the Democratic platform advocates broader 
pathways to citizenship as immigrants are believed to enrich American society and culture. 
Therefore, examining partisanship’s impact on immigration opinion can supply meaningful 
information (Reeves & Johnson, 2008). 
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) argue that partisanship is a central variable in 
immigration opinion studies. The article reviews results from an experiment where respondents 
(that identify as Democrats or Republicans) were given two hypothetical immigrants with 
different attributes (gender, profession, etc.) and were asked which they would admit into the 
country. In contrast to much of the literature that argues party affiliation triggers certain cues in 
contemporary attitudes, this experiment showed very little contrast in attribute values. Democrats 
and Republicans have similar preferences when presented with immigrants that are well-
educated and high-skilled (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). While this one result does not 
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negate the literature arguing the differences in policy platforms between the two parties, it does 
posit further research into the types of immigrants that are preferable for both parties. 
When observed in isolation, it becomes easier to examine the differences. Given that 
conventional party platforms indicate that Democrats and Republicans typically have contrasting 
views on immigration in general, analyzing this variable as it relates to immigration opinion can 
illuminate a causal link. Thus, it is expected that Republicans would favor tighter immigration 
restrictions and Democrats a more open system. 
Socioeconomic Status 
The next variable to consider is socioeconomic status, which is a combination of two 
fundamental components: education and income. Typically, education and income move 
together—more education is likely to yield higher income. Of course, there are exceptions such 
as non-labor income from sources like market investments. In that case, more education is not 
required for higher income or wealth. Nonetheless, socioeconomic status can still be measured 
assuming that higher investments in education yield higher levels of labor income. What makes 
this variable different from its individual determinants is that socioeconomic status is partially a 
perceived state. In other words, an individual that perceives himself to be in the upper class 
would derive that from his high level of education and high paying skilled job and vice versa.  
As it pertains to immigration opinions, it is expected that higher socioeconomic statuses 
would be more likely to favor liberal immigration policies. This assumption returns to the 
individual components of socioeconomic status—higher levels of education signify a better 
understanding of the impacts of immigration and in turn, a greater ability to see the value in 
immigration. People with more education are likely to better understand political issues and 
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exhibit fewer perceptions of threat. As education attainment increases, labor income is expected 
to increase as well. However, having less education likely decreases one’s anticipated income as 
high-skilled and high-paying jobs usually require higher educational attainment.  
The case for higher income stems from greater feelings of security that prompt less 
hostility towards newcomers. People that earn higher incomes from their occupation likely feel 
less threatened by immigrants in the labor market. Illegal immigrants, for example, are more 
likely to enter jobs that require physical labor and for less wages. Someone who is near the 
middle or top of the socioeconomic scale will unlikely perceive high levels of threat from these 
immigrants as they are not competing in the same labor market. For someone closer to the 
working class, they might feel more threatened by increased immigration because of greater 
perceived competition. Therefore, greater feelings of hostility and insecurity are expected.  
Chavez (2016) measured several variables that influence opinions on immigration levels; 
one of which was “Self-Identified Class”. Participants identified as either Working, Lower, 
Middle, or Upper class. His results showed a dynamic relationship between immigrant attitudes 
and each class: as self-identified class increases, desires to reduce immigration “by a lot” 
decreases substantially- almost half of the lower class’ percentage (36.5% to 17%). However, 
going up in class only slightly increases desires to increase immigration “by a little”. Some of the 
implications Chavez draws from this is how immigrants affect social classes in different ways. 
Those in the upper class may feel more economically secure and do not view immigrants as a 
threat to their standing. Oppositely, the lower class may feel more threatened by newer 
populations that pose a risk to the lower class’ already fragile job security (Chavez, 2016). 
Drawing on economic security, Jetten, Mols, and Healy (2017) find that in both high and 
low socioeconomic groups, collective feelings of economic uncertainty increased opposition to 
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immigration. In contrast to the assumptions made by Chavez, Jetten et al. asserts that economic 
uncertainty decreases class security at all levels. The article’s literature review mentions previous 
studies that show the upper class’ greater openness and generosity towards incoming immigrants 
during stable economic periods. In other words, economic stability brought confidence and 
security to the upper class. When given news of a potential economic downturn, however, the 
upper class showed signs of relative depravation triggered by incoming groups. In the analysis, 
Jetten et al. demonstrated how the upper class opposes immigration more during economic 
instability. In the same graph, the lower class showed similar levels of opposition in both stable 
and instable conditions- both of which were of higher levels than either condition for the upper 
class.  
Socioeconomic status is rather arbitrary in nature as Jetten et al. and Chavez examined. 
This makes it difficult to isolate, especially when that polling data relies on the self-assessments 
of its respondents. However, when we isolate it into its two more distinct sub-variables-- 
education and income-- it becomes more quantitative. Polling agencies would likely receive 
more accurate answers to education levels and annual income than they would asking for a status 
with unclear definitions. As mentioned, these sub-variables are generally expected to move in the 
same direction (with some noted exceptions). Combining this with the scholarly literature, those 
with higher incomes and education likely feel more secure. In turn, we can develop a possible 
causal relationship where a higher sense of security (or socioeconomic status) will decrease a 
person’s opposition to immigrants as they are not perceived as a threat to them and vice versa.  
Locale 
The fourth variable to assess is the impact of geographic locale on immigration opinions. 
Including this measure is important because it incorporates theories of exposure and how 
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interacting with immigrants can change attitudes. Immigrants typically move into urban 
environments as they provide more economic opportunities. Americans that also live in 
immigrant-dense urban areas are likely to exhibit an ‘exposure’ effect, which is the 
normalization of outsiders as they become more ingrained in a community. Therefore, urban 
residents are likely to be more supportive of open immigration policies as they are not only 
tolerant of immigrants but recognize the economic benefit they provide. Oppositely, rural 
residents lack this ‘exposure’ effect as the population is sparse and may view whatever small 
influx of immigrants there are as disproportionate to the total immigration levels (Fennelly & 
Federico, 2008). In other words, rural residents likely view immigration as invasive and out of 
control. Thus, rural Americans will likely show higher opposition to immigration.  
As of June 2019, of the 44.4 million immigrants living in America, roughly one-quarter 
of them are from Mexico (Radford, 2019). The current literature on region’s influence mainly 
argues that urban areas on the West and East coast have more favorable opinions of immigrants 
than do regions with significant rural populations (Fennelly & Federico, 2008). The findings 
show how the ‘exposure’ effect brings about higher levels of tolerance of people from different 
cultures and backgrounds; which is true for urban areas (Chavez, 2016). These urban regions 
show greater tendencies to support immigration than rural, central areas. Urban environments 
create familiarity and generate greater feelings of inclusivity. As for rural areas, Fennelly & 
Federico attribute immigrant intolerance to several factors that include a disproportionate 
number of illegal immigrants in rural communities; a higher perceived level of economic threat; 
and the “Walmartization” effect. The last factor is a metaphor for the loss of a traditional era and 
settlement of foreigners that threaten previous ideas of identity (Fennelly & Federico, 2008). 
Their study found that rural residents hold significantly more negative opinions on immigrants 
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than do urban or suburban respondents. In nearly every category of statements (worded in 
negative context), rural respondents agreed with the following: “too many immigrants”, 
“immigrants take jobs away from Americans”, and “immigrants do not pay their fair share in 
taxes”. These responses all garnered over 60% agreement from rural respondents (Fennelly & 
Federico, 2008). 
More recent studies show similar results. Garcia and Davidson (2013) used rural and 
urban as independent variables to examine how they affect immigration attitudes. The study 
operated under the previous theoretical framework that urban and rural residents have distinct 
differences in opinions regarding immigration. For the most part, the study confirmed that 
assumption. Looking at “Beliefs about Immigration”, 35% of rural respondents said immigrants 
are good for the economy compared to 41% of urban respondents. Continuing in the same 
category, 41% of rural respondents said immigrants increase crime rates while 32% of urban 
respondents agreed. When measuring “American Identity”, Garcia and Davidson used an index 
to measure one’s belief that immigrants should be more like us. The study found, contrary to 
belief, that American Identity does not play a significant role in forming opinions among rural 
residents. Though, previous studies showed that the same group was heavily invested in the 
notion of traditional American customs and norms (Garcia & Davidson, 2013).  
Age and Sex 
Lastly, age and sex are two demographic variables that can influence immigration 
attitudes. These variables are included because the current literature has touched on their 
importance in how they can shape immigration beliefs. Beginning with age, measuring 
immigration attitudes among different generations provides another valuable vantage point. 
Including age as an independent variable may show if younger people really are more tolerant of 
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foreigners than older generations. Pew conducted a poll in January 2019 asking respondents if 
immigrants “strengthen our country because of their hard work and talents”. In Jones’ analysis, 
Millennials (born 1981-1996) consistently responded in favor of the statement more than any 
other generation included in the poll (Gen X, Boomer, and Silent) (Jones, 2019). According to a 
GenForward Survey in 2018, 75% of Millennial Trump voters “support creating pathways for 
citizenship for law-abiding immigrants” (Cohen, Fowler, Medenica, & Rogowski, 2018). This 
study also found that significant proportions of Millennials disapprove of statements 
characterizing immigrants as hostile to American culture, taking away jobs, and increasing the 
crime rate. However, when broken down by race, a significant number of White Millennials 
(42%) agreed with the previous statements (Cohen et al., 2018). Shortly before the 2016 election, 
the Collage Group (2016) found in a study that in contrast to Millennials, “both gen-Xers and 
boomers are [4 and 9% respectively] more likely than average to say immigration is bad”. These 
studies typically explain this difference as a result of the inherent diversity younger generations 
are surrounded by.  
Moving to sex, Chavez (2016) includes this variable in his analysis of immigration 
attitudes. His initial conclusion was that men tend to be more open about immigration; however, 
because other factors like race and religion were not controlled for, he concludes that sex is 
spurious. Berg (2010) makes a more concrete argument which states that women are more likely 
to be pro-immigrant because of their socialization that encourages them to be other-oriented and 
nurturers. Oppositely, socialization for men encouraged self-socialization. In his analysis of a 
2004 General Social Survey, Berg also found that women were actually not pro-immigrant in 
every immigrant attitude question. When asked if immigrants take jobs away from native-born 
Americans, women were more likely to disagree with the statement. However, women were also 
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less likely to agree that immigrants are good for the economy (Berg, 2010). While this analysis 
emphasized an intersectional approach to gender, race, and education, it does provide some 
results showing how, when controlling for other factors, men and women may have different 
immigration attitudes. 
Section IV: Hypotheses and Model 
As aforementioned, the independent variables I utilize are nativism, partisanship, 
socioeconomic status (education and income), locale, age, and sex. The data source used to 
examine their influence on immigration attitudes is from a 2018 poll conducted by Pew.2  
Nativism is rather equivocal in public opinion polls, but still observable. As previously 
discussed, measuring nativism typically involves more complex methods like implicit 
association tests. If a public opinion poll asked respondents if they were biased against 
immigrants or racist towards certain groups, they would likely say “no”. However, these feelings 
can still be measured by changing the wording of questions to tap into those sentiments without 
being explicit in doing so. Most polls examining implicit bias use phrases instead of questions. 
They ask respondents if they agree or disagree with the one or, if offered multiple, the one they 
associate with more. Although polling answers are different, they can ultimately be categorized 
into positive or negative sentiments about immigrants and their effect on American culture. 
Positive sentiments are those that argue immigrants are good for America’s culture while 
negative sentiments show immigrants as threatening. The expectation is that those who agree 
with statements about immigrants having a positive effect on the country will support more 
 
2 Pew Research Center. (2018, June 28). Shifting Public Views on Legal Immigration Into the U.S. Retrieved from 
https://www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/ 
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immigration (and thus exhibit fewer nativist tendencies) and vice versa. Specific question 
wordings used in my analysis will be explained further in the next section. 
Partisanship will be measured by focusing on Democrats and Republicans. The reason 
Independents are excluded is because the assumption is that those that identify as Independent, 
leaning Republican, or leaning Democrat are not heavily influenced by party platforms. Thus, 
their opinions are likely based on other reasons. Limiting the partisan variable to Democrats and 
Republicans also maintains the reflection of the two-party system such that it captures those 
leaning in either direction. In doing this, measuring the relationship by party should reveal how 
strong partisanship can influence immigrant sentiment. Given the literature review and 
conventional knowledge of party platforms, there is an expectation for Republicans to favor less 
immigration. 
 Socioeconomic status is also complex to measure. However, as explained in the literature 
and for the purposes of my model, it is measured by income and education. Typically, these 
components move in a positive direction together. The assumption for this examination is that 
higher income and education attainment yields a higher socioeconomic status. Increases in 
income and education are likely to increase one’s feeling of economic security and tolerance of 
immigrants. Because socioeconomic status is a rather arbitrary measurement, polling respondents 
are not expected to self-identify. Polls typically ask respondents to select his/her highest level of 
education and annual income. These two sub-variables will be examined together as 
socioeconomic status. Since education and income are defined on spectrums, they can be 
categorized as brackets or ranges. Education includes some high school, high school, some 
college, college, and beyond. Similarly, income can be grouped by intervals such as $0-$5,000, 
$5,001-$10,000, etc. Given the current literature on changing attitudes between socioeconomic 
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classes, we can expect to see less opposition to immigrants as both education attainment and 
income increase (Chavez, 2016; Jetten et al., 2017).  
 Locale is the fourth independent variable. This variable will be strictly defined as “urban” 
or “rural”. Like partisanship, omitting the in-between option (in this case “suburban”) helps 
isolate the extremes to measure the effect. Rural is typically defined as remote, countryside areas 
a distance from any sizeable cities. Urban locales are densely populated cities or moderate to 
large metropolitan areas. The importance of this variable comes from the tendency of immigrants 
to move into urban areas. As Chavez (2016) notes, the ‘exposure’ effect is the higher level of 
tolerance exhibited by urban citizens towards immigrants because of closer proximity and more 
interactions. Fennelly and Federico (2008) examine how rural citizens see higher proportions of 
illegal immigrants that are typically employed in food processing and agricultural businesses. 
Thus, their perception is that illegal immigrants are large in number and represent a greater 
proportion of total immigration. From this, we can expect that urban immigrants are less likely to 
oppose immigration while rural are more likely to do so.  
 Age is the first demographic variable under examination. As mentioned in the literature, 
age becomes a relevant factor because of the difference in political, economic, and/or social 
values of different generations. Millennials, for example, are more likely to hold pro-immigrant 
views as opposed to older generations like Baby Boomers or those from Gen X. This is because 
the former embodies changing views on the role of government and places more importance on 
racial and cultural diversity. Democratic socialism, as highlighted in the 2016 presidential 
campaign, garnered significant support among young voters. Oppositely, older age groups like 
those age 65 or older tend to hold more conservative views. An AP poll in 2018 found that 49% 
of Republican voters in the 2018 election cycle were 65 or older (Birnbaum, 2018). Although 
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partisanship is somewhat tied to certain age groups, isolating age and testing it against 
immigration attitude questions will better determine differences between those generations in 
terms of immigrant sentiments. Therefore, it is expected that younger people will exhibit greater 
pro-immigrant attitudes and older people will likely show greater anti-immigrant attitudes. 
 Sex may also explain differences in immigration attitudes given the sociological theories 
behind different male and female socializations. The assumptions are that males are socialized in 
the U.S. to be more self-oriented, individualistic, and hostile towards outsiders. Females are 
supposedly more other-oriented and, because of their maternal instincts, more nurturing and 
tolerant of others. Of course, these assumptions are not universally accepted, especially in the 
U.S. As noted by Berg (2010), women have different opinions on immigrants when framed in 
social or economic contexts. Nonetheless, we may expect males to hold less favorable attitudes 
towards immigrants and women will hold more favorable views. However, if the assumption 
does hold, the degree will likely be significantly less than previous variables pertaining to 
political and/or social characteristics. 
Section V: Research Design 
To measure the degree to which each of the independent variables are predictors of 
immigrant attitudes, I utilized a June 2018 dataset from Pew Research Center to run a binary 
logistic regression model. The data comes from a telephone survey of 2,002 adults using a 
random digit dial sample. This dataset was published alongside an article that reported changes 
in immigration attitudes among Americans.3 Although the poll examined the attitudes of a 
variety of central attitudes, the focus was on immigration. For the dependent variable, I utilized a 
 
3 Pew Research Center. (2018, June 28). Shifting Public Views on Legal Immigration Into the U.S. Retrieved from 
https://www.people-press.org/2018/06/28/shifting-public-views-on-legal-immigration-into-the-u-s/ 
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question (Q.94) asking, “Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present 
level, increased, or decreased?” (See Appendix A). This question was selected because it is void 
of any loaded language that depicts immigrants in a positive or negative manner. Given the 
survey, it is the most objective question to measure immigration attitudes as it does not elicit an 
answer based on any one independent variable. For instance, there is no mention of origin, skill 
levels, or legal status. Had these components been added to the question, it would likely put 
more emphasis on answers based on party platforms or perhaps education attainment. In other 
words, using this question as the dependent variable puts all the independent variables on the 
same level.  
 To conduct the binary logistic regression analysis, the coding options for the dependent 
variable was adjusted to reflect a binary scale. A value of 1 indicates a positive attitude towards 
immigrants and a value of 0 indicates a negative attitude. “Kept at present level” and “Increased” 
were both recoded as 1 as they indicate favorable attitudes or at least tolerance towards 
immigrants. “Decreased” was recoded as 0 to indicate negative immigration attitudes. For any 
answers “Don’t know/Refused”, the cases were omitted.   
The independent variables examined in the dataset are party affiliation, education, 
income, sex, and age. Party affiliation was also recoded to match the 0-1 scale that defines the 
dependent variable.4 Any answer “Republican” was coded 0 as Republicans are more likely to 
hold anti-immigrant opinions. “Democrats” were coded 1 as they are more likely to hold positive 
views of immigrants. All other answers were omitted. Similarly, sex was recoded in binary so 
that males are valued 0 as they are more likely to hold negative immigrant attitudes and females 
 
4 “In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or independent?” 
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are valued at 1 as they are more likely to hold positive immigrant attitudes. Again, all other 
answers were omitted.  
Education, income, and age were left as is because they are naturally defined by ranges. 
Similarly, any “Don’t know/Refused” cases were omitted from the dataset. For nativism and 
locale, there were no explicit measurements available. This is likely because of the impracticality 
of asking such subjective questions. As Knoll and Lee & Kim have argued, nativism is best 
measured through implicit association. Respondents are unlikely to be willing to explicitly say 
they are anti-immigrant or prejudiced against foreigners. To account for nativism in this data, I 
selected Q.92 as its indicator. It asks, “Just in general… how sympathetic would you say you are 
toward immigrants who are in the United States illegally”. This question provides a sufficient 
equivalent for nativism because it taps into the core nativist beliefs that immigrants threaten 
American culture. Those that are unsympathetic of illegal immigrants likely feel that way 
because immigrants to them are a threat. The inclusion of “illegal” in the question is also 
important. Respondents with nativist attitudes are likely less sympathetic of illegal immigrants 
because of the strong feelings they have on protecting border security. Therefore, any answer 
“Very sympathetic” and “Somewhat sympathetic” were recoded as 1 to indicate support for 
immigration and thus little to no nativist tendencies. Any answers “Somewhat UNsympathetic 
[sic]” and “Very UNsympathetic [sic]” were recoded as 0 to indicate opposition to immigration 
and thus greater nativist tendencies. Any “Don’t Know/Refused” cases were omitted. Although 
this translation is not a perfect substitute, it accounts for at least one of the key aspects of nativist 
behavior.  
The other independent variable given an equivalent indicator was locale. Despite the 
existence of literature describing its importance, explicitly defining urban and rural is often 
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subjective. For instance, rural areas in the South may have significantly different populations 
than those in the North. To measure this variable, I placed a greater emphasis on the exposure 
effect as an alternative way of defining attitudes exhibited by urban and rural respondents. Q.100 
in the Pew survey provided the best measure for this variable. It asks, “How often do you 
personally come in contact with immigrants who speak little or no English”. Those that answered 
“Often” or “Sometimes” were recoded as 1 as they are expected to experience a high exposure 
effect, which likely places them in the urban category and thus supportive of immigration. Any 
answers “Rarely” or “Never” were recoded as 0 because this represents a lack of exposure such 
as in rural areas and thus would be more opposed to immigration. 
As previously stated, a binary logistic model was utilized to analyze American public 
views regarding the issue of immigration. This statistical technique was used because the 
dependent variable was broken down into a bivariate variable. Due to the omission of the “Don’t 
Know/refused” responses, the number of cases for this model decreased from 2,002 to 953. 
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Table 1: Binary Logistic Results of Support for Immigration 
Independent 
Variable 
Coefficient S.E. Significance Odds Ratio 
Percentage 
Change in 
Odds 
Nativism (Q.92) .856** .181 .000 2.353 135.3 
Party .929** .186 .000 2.533 150.3 
Education .115** .053 .030 1.122 12.2 
Income .153** .039 .000 1.165 16.5 
Locale (Q.100) .120 .194 .537 1.127 - 
Age -.013* .053 .005 .987 -1.3 
Sex .161 .168 .340 1.174 - 
Constant -.648 .418 .112 .523 - 
p < .05 
N = 953 
-2 Log likelihood = 913.482 
Nagelkerke R-Square = .195 
Section VI: Analysis and Discussion 
 The results reported in Table 1 show that nativism, party, education, income, and age 
were all significant at the p < .05 level as predictors of support for immigration. Also, each of the 
significant variables move in the anticipated direction with the dependent variable. This is in 
alignment with the literature and my hypotheses. Sex and locale were not significant and 
therefore refute my hypotheses. Although most of the variables tested are significant, the 
Nagelkerke R-Square value of 0.195 suggests that further research is required to better 
understand their predictive ability. 
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 Nativism (p = .000) was a surprisingly strong predictor of support for immigration. 
Recall that Q.92 asked respondents about their sympathy for illegal immigrants (See Appendix 
A). A one unit increase in Q.92 (that is, more sympathy) raised the probability of answering 
“increased” by 135.3%. In other words, those that exhibited fewer nativist tendencies by 
expressing more sympathy towards illegal immigrants were more likely to be supportive of 
immigration. Although the model presented this independent as highly significant, the translation 
of a subjective variable into a survey-provided question is not conclusive. Nativist attitudes are 
not strictly defined by sympathy for illegal immigrants; rather, it was simply the best option out 
of the given questions to represent this variable.   
Political party affiliation (p = .000) exhibited a very strong influence on the dependent 
variable. Using the percent change in odds, a one unit increase in party (moving towards 
Democrat) increases the likelihood of answering “increased” by 150.3%. Therefore, party 
affiliation is a robust indicator of immigration attitudes as Democrats are more supportive of 
immigration and vice versa. Given both the established policy platforms and the recent partisan 
divides on immigration policy, the strength of this independent was anticipated.  
The results in Table 1 also show that education (p = .030) proved to be a strong indicator 
of immigration attitudes. According to the model, the odds ratio of 1.122 indicates that a one unit 
increase in education increases the likelihood of answering “increased” by 12.2%. Thus, 
individuals with higher education attainment are more likely to be supportive of immigration. In 
concurrence with the literature and my hypothesis, more schooling typically results in a greater 
understanding of complex political issues as well as greater tolerance of cultural diversity.  
Income (p = .000) was also a strong predictor of immigration attitudes. The percent 
change in odds ratio showed that a one unit increase in income raised the possibility of 
 THE UNDERLYING VARIABLES OF IMMIGRATION ATTITUDES 27 
answering “increased” by 16.5%. Hence, higher levels of income are expected to bring about 
more attitudes supportive of immigration. It is worthy of note that this ratio is close to that of 
education (12.2%). Since education and income are the sub-variables of socioeconomic status, 
this result may give further credibility to the argument that they move together in a positive 
direction.  
Lastly, age is also a strong predictor of immigration attitudes (p = .005), exhibiting a 
negative relationship as discussed in the literature and my hypothesis. Because the relationship is 
negative, this affirms the generation argument, which says younger generations are more likely 
to exhibit tolerant attitudes towards immigrants. The percent change in odds ratio shows that a 
one unit increase in age decreases the likelihood of answering “increased” on Q.94 by 1.3%. 
Therefore, as age increases, support for immigration decreases. Although this change is 
marginal, it is not expected that the difference in opinions would change much within a 
generation. As the age gap increases, for example, between a 20-year-old and a 60-year-old, we 
should begin to see greater differences as different generations begin to appear.   
 Despite the relative strength of this model, sex and locale proved to be insignificant as 
determinants of immigration attitudes. This is likely because men and women today are much 
less defined by their traditional roles. Differences between contemporary socialization for men 
and women are likely less distinct and influential in political beliefs. In relation to immigration 
attitudes, the differences in behavior may be more likely to come from other variables 
mentioned. For example, the “others-focused” mentality designated to women may be influential 
not because it is a female-specific attitude but because it is an element of the Democratic 
platform—or perhaps a behavior exhibited by someone with less nativist sentiment. The 
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immigration debate arguably calls upon sex differences less than abortion or economic 
inequality, for instance.  
 The insignificance of locale was likely due to an insufficiency in choosing Q.100 as an 
equivalent of the variable. Using this question asked in the survey first required defining urban 
and rural as different levels of exposure and subsequently the question that best described that 
exposure effect. Defining urban and rural areas is a difficult task in itself. There are several 
variations within both urban and rural areas that inhibit attempts to classify them. While this 
dataset did mention an urban-rural measure, it was defined by area codes of the respondent and 
thus could not be included in the model. So, equating locale instead to the exposure element led 
to the selection of Q.100. While this choice provided the best fit with the given data, it was still a 
matter of subjectivity. Also, Q.100 mentions contact with immigrants “who speak little or no 
English”. This element could have further complicated its utility as it focuses on contact with 
new immigrants rather than those who are more established. Another consideration may be that 
immigrants are not as concentrated in urban areas or sparse in rural areas as previously believed. 
While the literature argues on solid ground that there is a difference between urban and rural 
immigration attitudes, further research would require a better definition of those areas. 
 Nonetheless, this model provides valuable insight into the underlying determinants of 
immigration attitudes. Age, education attainment, income, party affiliation, and nativist 
tendencies all substantially contribute to the formation of those opinions. Moreover, party 
affiliation and nativism have shown to be very strong indicators. While partisanship may be an 
obvious determinant, it does propose an intensifying relationship. Of course, immigration has 
always been a partisan issue; but since the Trump administration began, the debate has 
continuously increased in salience. Campaign rhetoric about the border wall with Mexico; the 
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caravan of Latin American asylum-seekers in late 2018; and the implementation of a “zero-
tolerance” policy against illegal immigrants have all been pushed to the forefront over the past 
few years. Because these events have arguably been spearheaded by the President (who is the 
head of his respective party), we have begun to see the deepening infusion of immigration policy 
with party platforms. Consequently, as immigration consumes a larger share of one party 
platform, the same is expected to happen with the other. As the debate is increasingly defined by 
party lines, Americans will likely begin to develop their opinions based on them.  
 Also, as a note on one of the strong indicators, the results of the ‘nativism’ variable 
should be interpreted cautiously. Although Q.92 was the best option for translating the variable, 
it remains subjective and does not fully capture all nativist tendencies like xenophobia, racism, 
and/or nationalism. When conducting public opinion polls, accessing these beliefs becomes more 
difficult as people may be unwilling to report them. However, the obstacles surrounding nativist 
measurements are not as limiting as that of the locale variable. Knoll (2013) and Pérez (2010) 
have demonstrated the utility in using IAT’s to tap into nativist sentiments. The combination of 
IAT’s with public opinion measurements in the context of immigration attitudes is a possible 
avenue for further research given the recent surges in the issue’s popularity. 
Conclusion 
 The purpose of public opinion polls is not only to analyze a snapshot of current 
sentiments and beliefs, but to use that analysis as a guide for legislators. Other possible 
approaches for research can examine trends, perhaps showing the evolution of those underlying 
variables. Granted, the American public is never unanimous on anything and even evidence of 
clear majority opinions must still be given careful consideration before implementation. Yet, the 
analysis of where those opinions came from can provide that crucial information to lawmakers. 
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In the context of immigration attitudes, by showing how strong of an indicator partisanship is, it 
should become clear that real, comprehensive immigration reform will require a bipartisan 
approach. One of the implications of this research is that people are very likely to form their 
immigration opinions from party platforms, especially within recent years. Although other 
factors like age, income, and education were all statistically significant, party affiliation 
exhibited a substantially stronger effect. However, with this strong effect on the debate, the 
possibility of immigration becoming a strictly partisan issue is also present. Each side can rally 
support for one extreme over the other, rendering any bipartisan approaches nearly impossible. 
Nonetheless, to dilute this strong (and perhaps toxic) grip partisanship has on the debate, change 
must come from the top. 
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Appendix A 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
Q.94 Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be kept at its present level, increased 
or decreased? 
 
 1 Kept at present level 
  Increased 
 0 Decreased 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
Independent Variables 
 
NATIVISM (Q.92) Just in general … how sympathetic would you say you are toward 
immigrants who are in the United States illegally? 
 
 1 Very sympathetic 
  Somewhat sympathetic 
 0 Somewhat UNsympathetic 
  Very UNsympathetic 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
PARTY In politics TODAY, do you consider yourself a Republican, Democrat, or 
 independent? 
 
 0 Republican 
 1 Democrat 
 OMIT Independent 
 OMIT No preference 
 OMIT Other party 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
EDUC  What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you 
 have received? 
 
 1 Less than high school (Grades 1-8 or no formal schooling) 
 2 High school incomplete (Grades 9-11 or Grade 12 with NO diploma) 
 3 High school graduate (Grade 12 with diploma or GED certificate) 
 4 Some college, no degree (includes some community college) 
 5 Two year associate degree from a college or university 
 6 Four year college or university degree/Bachelor’s degree (e.g., BS, BA, AB) 
 7 Some postgraduate or professional schooling, no postgraduate degree (e.g. some 
 graduate school) 
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Appendix A Cont. 
 
8 Postgraduate or professional degree, including master’s, doctorate, medical or law 
 degree (e.g., MA, MS, PhD, MD, JD, graduate school) 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
INCOME Last year, that is in 2017, what was your total family income from all sources, 
 before taxes? Just stop me when I get to the right category. 
 
 1 Less than $10,000 
 2 10 to under $20,000 
 3 20 to under $30,000 
 4 30 to under $40,000 
 5 40 to under $50,000 
 6 50 to under $75,000 
 7 75 to under $100,000 
 8 100 to under $150,000 
 9 $150,000 or more 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
LOCALE (Q.100) How often do you personally come into contact with immigrants who 
speak little or no English … 
 
 1 Often 
  Sometimes 
 0 Rarely 
  Never 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
AGE  What is your age? 
 
 _______ years 
 97 97 or older 
 OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
SEX 
0 Male 
1 Female 
OMIT Don’t Know/Refused 
 
 
 
